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I 
A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about 
the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who 
suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity 
(rational activity of soul), and that the virtues are traits of character 
which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or 
well.1 The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as 
functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to 
some independent goal or end which they enable people to attain 
(human flourishing, rational perfection, participation in practices, 'nar- 
rative unit/ in a life). Some recent philosophers seem to have hoped 
that by following this perfectionist strategy, we might attain a more 
convincing account of our moral practices than rule-based theories of 
ethics have been able to provide.2 
But the hopes are not well-founded. The perfectionist strategy re- 
quires us to specify an independent goal or end which the virtues best 
enable us to attain, and if the strategy is to succeed the goal or end that 
it specifies" must constitute an objectively good state for humans to be in 
- otherwise the claim that the virtues enable us to achieve this end or 
goal will not serve to justify or support them. The prospects for identi- 
1 See in particular the Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 7. 
2 See, for example, Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press 1981); and James Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca: Cornell Unviersity 
Press 1978). 
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fying an independent goal or aim which is objectively good in this way, 
however, do not look very good. Those ends which are genuinely good 
states for humans tend to be too vaguely characterized to support the 
claim that the virtues best enable us to attain them (consider 'flourish- 
ing/ or 'rational excellence' in this connection); while those ends which 
are more determinate tend to be poor candidates for an objective human 
good (consider 'the narrative unity of a life spent searching for the 
human good/ proposed by Alasdair Maclntyre).3 
If we abandon the perfectionist strategy, however, the question arises 
whether a philosophical study of the virtues has anything distinctive to 
contribute to our understanding of morality. In my view, the most 
promising way to return a positive answer to this question is to focus 
on the issues of practical reason and practical rationality. Thus it has 
seemed to many philosophers that an Aristotelian approach to the 
virtues yields a conception of practical reason and its corresponding 
excellence (phronesis, or practical wisdom) which does not fit readily into 
the Humean and Kantian categories that have become conventional in 
contemporary discussions. Among the most prominent of these philoso- 
phers is John McDowell. His suggestive recent work on the virtues aims 
in part to defend and develop a broadly Aristotelian account of practical 
reason and practical rationality as an alternative to the now-standard 
Humean and Kantian accounts.4 At the same time McDowell is explicit 
in rejecting the perfectionist strategy sketched above - indeed, he goes 
so far as to question whether Aristotle himself ever meant to follow that 
strategy.5 If McDowell is right about this, then the study of the virtues 
can contribute a distinctive perspective to our understanding of practi- 
cal reason, even if we give up the unpromising perfectionist strategy. 
3 After Virtue, ch. 15 
4 McDowell's views are developed in the following series of papers (which I shall 
henceforth refer to by abbreviations of their titles): 'Are Moral Requirements 
Hypothetical Imperatives?' The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1978) 
13-29; 'Virtue and Reason/ The Monist 62 (1979) 331-50; 'The Role of Eudaimonia in 
Aristotle's Ethics/ reprinted in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Ber- 
keley: University of California Press 1980) 359-76; 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Fol- 
lowing,' in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich, eds., Wittgenstein: To Follow a 
Rule (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981) 141-62; 'Values and Secondary 
Qualities/ in Ted Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1985) 110-29; and 'Might There Be External Reasons?' in J.EJ. Altham 
and Ross Harrison, eds., World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Moral Philosophy of 
Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press forthcoming). 
5 See The Role of Eudaimonia/ 
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I shall take McDowell's work on practical reason to provide my 
starting point in this essay - both because McDowell has gone further 
than other philosophers in trying to explain and defend an Aristotelian 
conception of practical reason, as a live option in contemporary discus- 
sions; and because the account he provides is difficult enough to benefit, 
in my view, from critical reconstruction and analysis. But my aim in the 
essay is not simply to scrutinize McDowell's views. By looking in detail 
at his position, I think we can learn something more generally about the 
problems and the prospects of a broadly Aristotelian approach to prac- 
tical reason. 
My discussion of these issues divides into three parts. In the first part 
I set out the conventional Kantian and Humean positions on practical 
reason, and consider the arguments that McDowell brings to bear 
against these accounts. Here I maintain that Humean and Kantian 
accounts share a common commitment to the idea that the requirements 
of virtue can be formulated in terms of general principles or procedures 
for practical reflection, and I suggest that McDowell's alternative ac- 
count is distinctive in rejecting this idea; but I conclude that McDowell's 
stated objections to principle-dependent accounts of practical reason are 
not compelling. Even if McDowell's specific arguments against Kantian 
and Humean approaches are unsuccessful, however, it may still be the 
case that his Aristotelian alternative is superior, and this is the possibility 
I turn to in the second part of the essay. I contend that there are two ways 
to develop McDowell's alternative account, one of which yields a ver- 
sion of rational intuitionism, while the other pictures practical reason as 
a form of connoisseurship; and I argue that the connoisseurship inter- 
pretation is the more promising one. In the conclusion, however, I try to 
show that the connoisseurship interpretation encounters two potential 
problems, when applied in the conditions that govern modern moral 
life; and I urge that it is too early to give up on principle-dependent 
accounts, in favor of McDowell's Aristotelian alternative. 
II Reason, Desire, and the Conception of 
How to Live 
Kantian and Humean positions in ethics traditionally differ on the 
question of whether reason can give rise to a motivation to act. The 
Kantian answers this question affirmatively, holding that pure reason 
can be practical in its issue, and that it is possible to explain motivation 
and action in terms of the grasping of reasons or justifications for action. 
The Humean, by contrast, returns a negative answer to the question. On 
this view, rational reflection cannot by itself give rise to motivation; 
rather, motivation has its source in the agenf s prior desires, and practi- 
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cal reasoning (to the extent it exists) must always begin from those 
desires.6 
It is important to bear in mind that both parties to this debate can and 
should acknowledge that desires always have a role to play in the 
explanation of motivation and action. That is, the Kantian no less than 
the Humean should maintain that motivation requires the presence of 
desires.7 Once this point is admitted, however, the Kantian will want to 
attach great significance to a distinction between two different kinds of 
desires. Some desires - what Thomas Nagel has called the 'motivated' 
ones8 - are such that they can appropriately be explained in terms of 
other propositional attitudes of the agenf s. This form of explanation is 
distinctive in that the propositional content of the states which explain 
the motivated desire also rationalize or justify the desire; and we may 
accordingly say that the defining mark of motivated desires is that they 
admit of a rationalizing explanation. Unmotivated desires, on the other 
hand, are simply desires that do not admit of such a rationalizing 
explanation.9 
In these terms, a crucial point at issue between the Humean and the 
Kantian concerns the form taken by the rationalizing explanations of 
motivated desires. For their part, Humeans maintain that such explana- 
6 I follow McDowell in distinguishing between practical reason and practical reason- 
ing (see 'Virtue and Reason/ 349, n. 22): the former refers to the broader class of 
cases in which motivation and action are explained in terms of reasons; the latter, 
to the subset of these cases in which motivation and action are preceded by an 
episode of reasoning or deliberation. I assume that the Kantian and the Humean 
take divergent positions on the broader issue of practical reason, which determine 
correspondingly divergent positions on the question of practical reasoning. 
Note also that the Humean claim that practical reasoning has its source in an 
agent's desires needn't entail that such reasoning is instrumental or maximizing. 
On this point see Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons/ as reprinted 
in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981) 101-13 - dis- 
cussed by McDowell in 'Might There be External Reasons?' 
7 The reason for this, in brief, is that motivation and intentional action are goal-di- 
rected phenomena, where such goal-directedness in turn requires the presence of 
desire; cf . Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1978), ch. V. McDowell accepts this point: see, e.g., his 'Are Moral Require- 
ments/ 14-15. 
8 The Possibility of Altruism, 29. McDowell refers to such desires as 'consequential' or 
'consequentially-ascribed' desires: see 'Are Moral Requirements/ 15, 25. 
9 For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between motivated and unmoti- 
vated desires, and its significance for the dispute between Kantians and Humeans, 
see my paper 'How to Argue about Practical Reason/ Mind 99 (1990) 355-85. 
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tions always terminate with the citation of a basic evaluative premise, 
which cannot be explained or justified in rational terms, but which is 
fixed, rather, by some intrinsic or unmotivated desire. This is what the 
Humean means in saying that motivation always has desire at its source, 
and that practical reasoning necessarily begins from the agent's prior or 
given desires. Kantians, by contrast, deny these claims. They insist that 
pure reasoning or reflection - processes of thought that do not begin 
from the agenfs prior desires - are sometimes sufficient both to pro- 
duce motivation, and to explain rationally the motivated desires in- 
volved in such motivation. 
The conventional debate about practical reason, then, does not con- 
cern the presence of desires, on occasions of motivation and action; 
rather, it concerns the form taken by rationalizing explanations of de- 
sires. Kantians, however, characteristically make a further claim as well. 
This is that distinctively moral motivations and actions are requirements 
of rationality, so that a person who reasoned correctly should be moti- 
vated to act morally. For instance, Kant himself took the categorical 
imperative to represent a kind of norm of reason, which if applied 
correctly would lead one to perform all the actions that are morally 
required, and only actions that are permissible from the moral point of 
view. If this is right, it evidently follows that persons who do not act 
morally must be guilty of a kind of irrationality, a failure to bring their 
thought and action into conformity with the requirements of reason. On 
a Humean position, by contrast, this will not necessarily be the case. The 
Humean represents practical reason as having its source in antecedent 
desires, and a person who lacks moral motivations might fail to have 
any other antecedent desires that could be advanced by becoming 
morally virtuous. Of course, the desires at the basis of moral reasoning 
might be extremely entrenched and widely distributed in human popu- 
lations, as a matter of empirical fact. For his part, Hume seemed to think 
that an instinct to benevolence is knitted into the fabric of the human 
mind. More recently, T.M. Scanlon has represented moral reasoning as 
responding to a powerful and widespread desire that people have to 
justify their actions and policies to others, on grounds that no one could 
reasonably reject.10 Neither of these accounts, however, provides re- 
sources for saying that the agent who lacks moral motivations altogether 
is on that account irrational. On- this point Humean and Kantian ap- 
proaches diverge, even if - as in the case of Scanlon's contractualism 
10 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism/ in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., 
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) 103-28 
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- the basic pattern of moral reasoning that the Humean describes has 
a Kantian flavor. 
In the terms of this conventional debate, McDowell's broadly Aristo- 
telian position does not fit comfortably into either of the received Kan- 
tian or Humean categories. He rejects the Humean position on the issue 
of practical reason and motivation, but he does so without endorsing 
the Kantian claim about the rationality of morality. 
Take first the issue of the rationality of ethics. In his paper 'Are Moral 
Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?' McDowell avers that the per- 
son who does not act virtuously need not on that account be irrational.11 
I take this claim to be the denial of the characteristically Kantian position 
that moral action is a requirement of reason, such that the person who 
reasoned or deliberated properly would be led to act morally. For if that 
Kantian position were correct, then the person who is not morally 
virtuous would be guilty of a kind of irrationality. In a different paper, 
2 
McDowell supports and develops this position with an interpretation 
of the ergon or function argument found in Book I of Aristotle's Nicom- 
achean Ethics. On this interpretation - which McDowell recommends as 
an appealing alternative to contemporary (Kantian) views - the point 
of the ergon argument is not to cite considerations which will rationally 
convince the amoralist to go over to the life of moral virtue. The thought 
that it must be possible to cite some such consideration, if morality is 
not to be revealed as a sham, is a Kantian prejudice, one that McDowell 
urges us to give up. What the amoralist needs is not rational argument, 
but a change in character, of the sort that can best be achieved through a 
program of moral training or habituation such as Aristotle describes in 
the Nicomachean Ethics.13 
11 'Are Moral Requirements/ 13, 24. Cf . 'Might There Be External Reasons?' §5, where 
McDowell represents the claim that the amoralist is necessarily irrational as 'bluff/ 
In the same section of this paper he allows that there might be a sense in which an 
amoral person could be considered irrational, associated with the normative claim 
that a virtuous agent is seeing matters 'correctly' or 'arighf; but he concludes that 
it would be best not to describe the amoralist in these terms, as the description 
encourages the mistaken inference that there is a process of reasoning or delibera- 
tion that could lead the amoralist to become virtuous. 
12 The Role of Eudaimonia/ esp. §§10-14 
13 Cf. 'Might There Be External Reasons?' (esp. §4), where McDowell says that if a 
person has not been brought up to be virtuous, then it will generally be too late to 
reason with the person; what is required, to make such a person virtuous, is rather 
something like 'conversion/ 
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Now, it is plausible to suppose that the character one acquires, as a 
result of this kind of training or habituation, will largely be defined by 
a certain class of 'unmotivated' desires. These are the long-term or 
standing desires, the dispositional states that determine an agenfs basic 
aims and goals, values and projects. They are 'unmotivated/ because 
they are not rationally explicable in terms of other propositional atti- 
tudes of the agent's. We do not account for their origin by adverting to 
any process of reasoning or deliberation that the agent goes through; 
rather, standing desires emerge gradually in the process of education 
and training, resulting from repeated performance of actions of certain 
general types.14 
If this is right, however, then a natural view to take would be that 
these 'unmotivated' standing desires are the source of the agenfs moti- 
vations, fixing the ends that practical reasoning and deliberation will 
aim at. That is, McDowell's rejection of the Kantian claim about the 
rationality of morality would appear to commit him to a Humean 
position on the question of practical reason and motivation. McDowell 
himself does not draw this inference, however. On the contrary, he offers 
a highly disparaging picture of the Humean approach to motivational 
psychology. In one especially memorable passage, for instance,15 he says 
that Humean accounts are wedded to a 'quasi-hydraulic' conception of 
the mind, which represents the will as the source of the forces that issue 
in behavior. The language here might seem to suggest that what is 
wrong with the Humean view is its (alleged) commitment to a mecha- 
nistic or causal account of the mind.16 But the suggestion is most likely 
inadvertent. McDowell's central complaint, repeated and developed in 
his other writings on ethics, is with the broader and more basic Humean 
claim that desires are the source of motivations: the idea that unmoti- 
vated intrinsic desires fix the necessary starting points for practical 
reasoning and deliberation. 
The question is, how does McDowell support this complaint? What 
exactly is meant to be wrong with the Humean approach to practical 
14 A good account of this process can be found in Myles Burnyeaf s paper 'Aristotle 
on Learning to be Good/ in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 69-92. 
15 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following/ 155 
16 Michael Smith interprets McDowell's complaint this way (and deftly deflates the 
complaint so interpreted) in his paper The Humean Theory of Motivation/ Mind 
96 (1987), 43-4. In 'Might there be External Reasons?' §6, McDowell states more 
clearly than in his earlier papers that he does not object to the claim that reason-giv- 
ing explanations are causal, only to the rigid schema into which the Humean 
attempts to force all such explanations. 
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reason; and can McDowell reject this approach, without being led back 
to a Kantian position on the rationality of morality? McDowell's answer 
to these questions is strongly influenced by his reading of Aristotle.17 He 
argues, in particular, that there is a distinctive feature of virtuous 
motivations, emphasized by Aristotle, which cannot be accounted for 
within the framework of Humean and Kantian approaches. 
Consider an ordinary case of virtuous action - say, stopping on one's 
way home from work to help a stranger push his car out of a snow bank. 
McDowell, as I understand him, admits that we can give a 'core expla- 
nation' of such an action that conforms to the Humean schema for 
explaining motivations.18 The question at issue is not whether there will 
be a desire present on this occasion of motivation - for reasons men- 
tioned above, we must say that in intentionally stopping to assist the 
stranger the virtuous agent had a desire to help the stranger get his car 
out of the snow. The question is how we are to explain this motivated 
desire, and on this question McDowell admits that our original or core 
explanation will turn out to satisfy the Humean strictures. Thus we can 
account for the motivated desire to help the stranger by invoking (say) 
the agenf s belief that the stranger needed assistance, plus a general or 
standing benevolent desire or concern19 to help people when they are in 
need of assistance (where this general disposition to benevolence is a 
result of the training or habituation of the agenf s sentiments from 
youth). 
Core explanations of virtuous action, then, conform to the Humean 
pattern. But McDowell contends that we cannot attain a complete expla- 
nation of virtuous action by attending to such core explanations alone, 
because of the unity of the virtues.20 The standing concerns or desires 
that mark the termini of core explanations correspond to individual 
virtuous traits. But virtue is not just an unorganized collection of such 
virtuous traits; rather, individual virtuous traits can only count as 
virtuous at all if they are copresent with other virtuous traits, and if the 
whole collection of such traits is appropriately structured and organ- 
ized. To return to our example, suppose that the person who stops to 
1 7 My exposition in the remainder of this section relies mainly on 'Virtue and Reason/ 
which I take to contain the most developed statement of McDowell's objection to 
the Humean approach. 
18 'Virtue and Reason/ 342-3 
19 McDowell himself uses the expression 'concern'; I take it he means by this the kind 
of long-term or standing desire I characterized above. 
20 'Virtue and Reason/ 332-3, 342-6 
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help the stranger in the snow had not been driving home from work at 
the time, but instead transporting a badly injured friend to the hospital. 
We could, it seems, give precisely the same 'core' explanation of the 
action of pushing the stranger's car, with a standing benevolent desire 
fixing the immediate end of the agenf s action. But it would be an error 
to suppose that the action so explained is virtuous in this context, 
because the agent's obligation to help the friend ought to have taken 
precedence. Virtue requires a plurality of concerns or desires, structured 
in a certain way, and we will only comprehend why an individual action 
was virtuous if we can see the action in the context of the agent's other 
standing concerns, and appreciate why one concern rather than another 
was effective in motivating the agent to act. 
It is at this point, McDowell suggests, that we need to go beyond the 
Humean approach to practical reason. He argues that we can only attain 
a complete understanding of virtuous action by appealing to the virtu- 
ous person's overall conception of how to live; for it is this conception that 
governs the relations among the agent's individual standing concerns, 
and renders intelligible why one such concern rather than another was 
effective on a given occasion, in motivating the agent to act.21 What 
finally explains virtuous action, it seems, is not the standing desire cited 
by a 'core' explanation, but the overall conception of how to live that 
structures and organizes the virtuous agenf s individual concerns. 
Of course, Humean and Kantian approaches to practical reason will 
have their own way of accounting for the virtuous agenf s guiding 
conception of how to live. On a Humean approach, for instance, the 
conception of how to live would most naturally be interpreted as an 
unmotivated higher-order desire, which plays an executive or regula- 
tive role in rational reflection about what to do.22 Thus on a utilitarian 
account the higher-order desire that is meant to regulate the virtuous 
agent's practical reflection is a form of generalized benevolence, 
whereas a contractualist account would postulate a higher-order desire 
to act in ways that can be justified to others, on grounds that no-one 
could reasonably reject. On both of these accounts the higher-order 
desire regulates practical reflection by specifying a general procedure 
or pattern of reasoning that guides the virtuous agent's decisions about 
21 'Virtue and Reason/ 343-6 
22 A different Humean position would say simply that the agent should act on 
whichever first-order desire happens to be strongest, at the time of action. But I take 
it this would amount to a denial that there is anything like a conception of how to 
live that could guide or regulate the virtuous agenf s choices. 
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what to do. Kantian accounts share this tendency to construe the virtu- 
ous agent's conception of how to live in terms of a general procedure or 
regulative pattern of practical reflection; only there is no need, on a 
strictly Kantian account, to postulate an unmotivated higher-order de- 
sire corresponding to the cited procedure. Kant's own categorical im- 
perative procedure, for instance, is meant to have rational authority in 
regulating our decisions about what to do, quite independently of 
whether we happen to have a higher-order desire to submit to that 
procedure. 
Clearly McDowell needs to reject these interpretations of the concep- 
tion of how to live, if he is to succeed in staking out an alternative to 
Humean and Kantian approaches; but his objections to them, and his 
own alternative interpretation, require careful reconstruction. With ap- 
parent reference to the Humean interpretation, McDowell concedes that 
the conception of how to live is what he calls an 'orectic' psychological 
state,23 which presumably means that it is desire-like in some respects. 
But he nevertheless does not think the conception of how to live can be 
construed as an 'over-arching' or higher-order desire, as the Humean 
would try to interpret it, because the desires involved in virtuous action 
are not 'independently intelligible/24 Now it is not always clear what 
exactly McDowell has in mind when he objects that Humean accounts 
postulate an independently intelligible desire at the source of the virtu- 
ous agent's motivation and action. McDowell sometimes seems to have 
taken the Humean to be claiming that all motivation has the same desires 
at its source, so that it would be a sufficient refutation of the Humean to 
show that the virtuous person's higher-order desires are simply not 
shared by the non-virtuous agent.25 But this claim is not sufficient to 
refute a minimally sophisticated version of the Humean position; the 
basic Humean thesis is that motivation has its source in desire, and this 
is distinct from, and weaker than, the claim that all motivation has the 
same desires at its source. 
At other points, and more subtly, McDowell attributes to the Humean 
the view that the higher-order desires which originate motivation must 
at least be externally intelligible - intelligible, that is, to those who do 
23 'Virtue and Reason/ 345, 346 
24 'Virtue and Reason/ 345-6; 'Are Moral Requirements/ 18-20, 22-3; 'The Role of 
Eudaimonia/ 372-3. McDowell attacks the idea of an 'over-arching' desire at the root 
of virtuous action, in place of the conception of how to live, in 'Virtue and Reason/ 
343. 
25 See, e.g., 'Virtue and Reason/ 346; 'Are Moral Requirements/ 19-20, 23, 25-6. 
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not share the desires themselves.26 But it is not obvious what the force 
of this claim is meant to be, as a criticism of the Humean view. Presum- 
ably a desire will be intelligible to a person just in case that person can 
anticipate the objects and activities that the desire would lead one to 
pursue, and understand sympathetically why those objects and activi- 
ties might be found desirable. Now McDowell seems correct to suppose 
that the desires that turn up in Humean accounts of moral reasoning are 
not likely to be externally unintelligible, in this sense. Humeans tend to 
select desires such as generalized benevolence, or the contractualist 
desire to act in ways that can be justified to others, in part precisely 
because they are fairly widely distributed, and because they pick out 
ends that people tend naturally to respond to under normal educational 
circumstances. But if McDowell finds this aspect of Humean accounts 
implausible, he needs to explain more specifically why the postulated 
desires do not provide an adequate basis for moral reasoning; it is not 
enough simply to observe that Humean accounts tend to represent the 
moral motives as widespread and accessible. And even if such an 
explanation should be forthcoming, so that the higher-order desires that 
regulate moral behaviour are shown to be neither widely distributed 
nor intelligible to those who lack them, this would not undermine the 
more basic Humean strategy of accounting for moral reasoning in terms 
of such higher-order desires. Higher-order desires might remain the 
regulative starting-points for moral deliberation, even if they are neither 
widely distributed nor easily intelligible to those who are not themselves 
virtuous already. 
There is, however, one further way we might interpret the notion of 
independent intelligibility, which suggests a more reliable contrast with 
Humean and Kantian interpretations of the conception of how to live. 
Thus both Humeans and Kantians maintain that the virtuous agent's 
conception of how to live is independently intelligible, in the sense that 
it can be formulated as a general procedure or principle for practical 
reflection, independently of and prior to particular circumstances of 
action and decision. Take the categorical imperative procedure, for 
instance, or the contractualist appeal to justification on the basis of 
hypothetical agreement: these forms of practical argument mark out the 
kinds of reasons that should regulate the virtuous agent's decisions 
quite independently of the details of any particular situation that might 
confront a virtuous agent. To say that the conception of how to live is 
independently intelligible, in this sense, is just to say that it is specifiable 
26 See, again, 'Virtue and Reason/ 345-6. 
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in terms of general principles or procedures; and practical reasoning 
which is regulated or governed by such a conception of how to live will 
therefore be reasoning in accordance with such general principles or 
procedures. We may put this by saying that, on Humean and Kantian 
accounts, moral reasoning on the basis of a conception of how to live is 
principle-dependent. 
Here, I think, we have a genuine point of contrast with McDowell's 
understanding of the conception of how to live; for on McDowell's 
interpretation the virtuous agenf s conception cannot be captured in 
terms of general principles or procedures, capable of being specified in 
advance of the circumstances of action. Rather, McDowell follows Aris- 
totle in supposing that the requirements of virtue resist codification in 
any exhaustive and exceptionless set of rules or principles.27 Moral 
reasoning in accordance with the conception of how to live, on McDow- 
ell's conception, therefore cannot be construed as principle-dependent 
reasoning. This raises two questions: why does McDowell reject the idea 
that the requirements of virtue can be given an adequate specification 
in terms of general principles or procedures? And how are we to 
understand the alternative that he offers to principle-dependent concep- 
tions of moral reasoning? I shall address the first of these questions in 
the remainder of this section; the second question will be taken up in the 
section to follow. 
Perhaps McDowell's most frequently stated objection to principle-de- 
pendent accounts of the conception of how to live is that they are 
committed to a simplistically mechanistic picture of moral reasoning. 
Thus he complains that the general principles or procedures which 
figure in Humean and Kantian accounts would be 'mechanically' appli- 
cable to cases, in a way inadequate to the complexity of a 'reasonably 
adult moral outlook.'28 Hence, McDowell seems to suggest, a tolerably 
sophisticated conception of how to live cannot be formulated in terms 
of such antecedent principles or procedures. Taken at face value, how- 
ever, this objection rests on something of a caricature of Kantian and 
27 'Virtue and Reason/ 340-2; cf. The Role of Eudaimonia,' 12, 14; 'Values and Secon- 
dary Qualities/ 122. In these passages McDowell is echoing Aristotle's famous 
claim that generalizations in practical philosophy hold only for the most part; see, 
for example, Nicomachean Ethics 1097b 12ff. 
28 'Virtue and Reason/ 336; cf . the reference to 'the inexorable workings of a machine/ 
on 339. Indeed, mechanistic images and terminology recur frequently in McDow- 
ell's characterization of the views in moral psychology that he opposes: for two 
other examples, see 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following/ 155; and 'Values and 
Secondary Qualities/ 122. 
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Humean approaches; for there is no reason to think that antecedent 
moral principles or procedures of justification would need to be me- 
chanically applicable to cases in the objectionable way McDowell de- 
scribes. For example, the more sophisticated recent interpreters of Kant 
agree in emphasizing the complexity of the processes whereby the 
categorical imperative procedure is brought to bear in the moral life.29 
Thus, the identification of an agent's maxim is anything but a mechani- 
cal procedure; and the implementation of a universalizable maxim, in 
specific historical and cultural circumstances, requires extensive reli- 
ance on forms of perception and intelligence that cannot in their turn be 
understood as involving the mechanical application of antecedent pro- 
cedures and principles. The categorical imperative procedure may tell 
you that you ought to be kind or helpful; but this will not take you very 
far if you lack the powers of judgment and imagination to determine 
what would be the truly kind or helpful action, in a given situation and 
culture.30 
The literal charge of mechanical applicability thus does not seem to 
hold against the more interesting variants of Kantian and Humean 
strategies. But perhaps, in making this charge, McDowell has something 
different in mind. His complaint might be an expression of skepticism 
about the whole idea that general principles or procedures could ever 
be adequate to the task of determining all of our particular duties or 
requirements in life. If such skepticism is justified, then the role of 
judgment and perception in moral decision cannot be restricted to the 
application of general principles, or to the implementation of general 
procedures of reflection and justification; judgment and perception 
must be more fundamentally or extensively implicated in determining 
what we are to do. 
The problem, however, is that McDowell has given us no reason to 
accept such general skepticism about the adequacy of principle-depend- 
29 See, for example, John Rawls, Themes in Kanf s Moral Philosophy/ in Eckart 
Forster, ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions (Stanford: Stanford University Press 
1989), 81-113 (especially §1); Otfried Hoffe, 'Kants kategorischer Imperativ als 
Kriterium des Sittlichen/ as reprinted in his Ethik und Politik (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp 1979), 84-119; and Onora O'Neill, 'Consistency in Action/ reprinted in 
her Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 81-104. 
30 Similar remarks apply, I think, to the version of contractualism proposed by Scanlon 
in 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism/ which I have presented as a version of the 
Humean position. The charge of mechanical applicability might have more force 
against utilitarian versions of the Humean position, though even here I think the 
objection requires careful handling. 
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ent conceptions to determine our particular moral duties and require- 
ments. General skepticism of this sort might seem reasonable, if one 
thought that the conception of how to live should amount to a compre- 
hensive individual conception of the good, capable of filling out in detail 
one's view of the valuable or desirable life; for it is indeed questionable 
that one's comprehensive conception of the good might be specifiable, 
even in outline, by reference to any general principle or procedure of 
reasoning. But it would be a mistake - one perhaps encouraged by talk 
about the 'conception of how to live' - to think that the principles or 
procedures which figure in Kantian and Humean accounts are meant to 
play this role. On their most plausible construal, such principles or 
procedures are not ways of giving content to a comprehensive individ- 
ual conception of the good, but function as moral constraints on individu- 
als in the conduct of their lives - they represent what Kant called 
'supreme limiting conditions' on one's pursuit of ends. There is no 
general reason to suppose that even a thoroughly 'adult' conception of 
such moral constraints could not be spelled out in terms of general 
principles or procedures. 
Beyond the specific objection on grounds of mechanical applicability, 
there is a more general tendency in McDowell's work to associate 
Kantian and Humean strategies with discredited foundationalist ap- 
proaches in philosophy. Thus he suggests at one point that principle-de- 
pendent conceptions of practical reasoning rest on a broader 
philosophical prejudice, to the effect that rational processes must be 
capable of being exhibited as 'automatically compelling, without de- 
pendence on our partially shared "whirl of organism."'31 McDowell is 
apparently assuming here that the attempt to characterize moral reason- 
ing in terms of general principles or procedures represents an effort to 
step outside our actual moral practices, and to legitimate them by 
constructing a rational justification for morality from the ground up, as 
it were. Indeed, this interpretation of Kantian and Humean approaches 
may explain why McDowell's criticism of them slides so easily between 
the idea that moral reasoning is principle-dependent and the different 
idea that it must be externally intelligible. For if the motivation of 
31 'Virtue and Reason/ 340. On the point at issue see, more generally, the whole of §4 
of that paper: though there are many things going on there, at least one of them is 
an attack on the idea that philosophical thought about our moral practices 'should 
be undertaken at some external standpoint, outside our immersion in our familiar 
forms of life' (341). As an objection to the kinds of principle-dependent accounts I 
have sketched, this complaint assumes that those accounts have foundationalist 
aspirations, and that is the assumption I am challenging. 
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principle-dependent accounts is the desire to provide a foundationalist 
justification of moral practices, the principles appealed to would have 
to be ones that those external to moral practices understand and respond 
to. At any rate, McDowell finds this foundationalist motivation deeply 
suspect, and suggests that once we have weaned ourselves from it (with 
the help of Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following), there will no 
longer be any temptation to adopt a principle-dependent conception of 
moral reasoning. 
Here again, however, McDowell's argument against principle-de- 
pendent interpretations of moral reasoning rests on something of a 
misconception. Take Scanlon's version of contractualism, on which 
moral reasoning is represented as appealing to a higher-order desire to 
act in ways that can be justified to others, on grounds no-one could 
reasonably reject. What motivates this account, I think, is not a wish to 
provide an external justification of moral practices, but the desire to 
interpret those practices in a way that displays the nature and appeal of 
moral reasons. To challenge that account it would be necessary to find 
fault with the details of Scanlon's interpretation, and to offer a better 
interpetation in its place; but the invocation of general anti-f foundation- 
alist considerations will not by itself tell against the account. Even 
strictly Kantian approaches do not necessarily seem vulnerable to such 
anti-foundationaUst considerations. Granted, the Kantian position, as I 
have represented it, does attempt to show that moral requirements are 
requirements of reason, and that they in some sense make claims on all 
of us. But this attempt need not take the form of going altogether outside 
moral practices, by (say) reducing moral motivations to considerations 
of enlightened self-interest. Rather, in its more sophisticated versions 
the Kantian position can be seen as offering its own interpretation of our 
moral practices, an interpretation on which sui generis moral motivations 
are revealed to be patterns of reflection to which we are all potentially 
responsive.32 This is an ambitious undertaking, perhaps even a unprom- 
ising one, but it does not necessarily rest on a dubious desire to provide 
an external foundation or justification for moral practices. 
32 In this connection, see Nagel's remarks about the 'method of interpretation/ in The 
Possibility of Altruism, 4, 18-23. Cf. 'Might there be External Reasons?' §5, where 
McDowell attributes to moral philosophers the desire to discover a 'knockdown' 
argument which would enable them to 'force' those indifferent to morality into 
caring about ethical ends. My point is that this characterization simply does not 
apply to sophisticated proponents of the Kantian approach, such as Nagel, who are 
under no illusions about the efficacy of their interpretations as instruments of moral 
reform or persuasion. 
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I hope I have now said enough to raise some doubts about the cogency 
of McDowell's stated objections to principle-dependent accounts of 
moral reasoning. To represent moral reasoning in terms of the following 
of general principles or procedures is not necessarily to characterize it as 
a mechanical or mindless process. Nor is it necessarily to suppose that our 
moral practices require an external foundation or justification. Rather, I 
have suggested that Humean and Kantian appeals to principle-depend- 
ent conceptions of practical reasoning should be seen as interpretations 
of our moral practices, which aim to illuminate the nature and appeal of 
distinctively moral reasons. Even if McDowell's conception of these 
accounts is something of a caricature, however, it might still be the case 
that his own understanding of the virtuous agenfs conception of how to 
live represents a superior interpretation of our moral practices. This is 
the possibility that we now need to assess; but to do so it will first be 
necessary to get clearer about what McDowell's alternative is. 
Ill Intuition and Connoisseurship 
To this point I have represented McDowell's account of the conception 
of how to live in negative terms, as resting on a rejection of principle-de- 
pendent conceptions of the requirements of virtue. McDowell does not 
seem to think that the practical reasoning of the virtuous agent can be 
represented accurately as an appeal to general principles or procedures, 
capable of being formulated independently of particular situations of 
virtuous action. At the same time he evidently believes that the virtuous 
agenfs individual decisions about what to do are deliverances of prac- 
tical reason. This leaves open the question of how we are to understand, 
more positively, the distinctively rational processes that lead to' and 
support the virtuous agenfs decisions. 
McDowell himself does not give us much help in answering this 
question. His account clearly requires that reason have a positive role to 
play in leading a virtuous life; but like Aristotle before him, McDowell 
tells us very little about what this form of practical reasoning is like, 
beyond saying that it does not involve the application of general princi- 
ples or procedures. To give the account some definite contours, and to 
see more precisely how it differs from Humean and Kantian strategies, 
it will therefore be necessary to go somewhat beyond the literal text of 
McDowell's various papers. In what follows I want to suggest that there 
are two different ways in which McDowell's broadly Aristotelian ac- 
count of practical reason might be developed: one of these yields a kind 
of rational intuitionism, and I shall contend that this way of developing 
the account is not very plausible. A second and more promising possi- 
bility delivers a conception of moral reasoning as a form of connoisseur- 
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ship; after sketching this interpretation, I shall return, in the final section 
of the paper, to consider its merits as against the principle-dependent 
interpretations of moral reasoning offered by Humeans and Kantians. 
To begin, note that principle-dependent accounts of moral reasoning 
provide terms for justifying individual virtuous decisions. Faced with a 
decision about what to do, the virtuous agent appeals to the antecedent 
principles or procedures, and deliberating in accordance with these 
principles or procedures yields a reason for choosing one alternative 
over the others that are available. Now one way to develop an alternative 
to such accounts would be to deny that the virtuous agent has any reason 
or justification for her individual virtuous decisions and choices. Rather, 
it might be that the virtuous agent, when faced with a decision, imme- 
diately sees or grasps what would be the right thing to do, without 
needing to offer any further reason or justification for her decision. Of 
course, it will always be open to the virtuous agent to defend her 
decisions about what to do by saying (for instance) that she has chosen 
to do the right thing, or that she has done what is for the best, on the 
whole. But these locutions do not need to be taken as providing an 
independent justification or rationale for her decisions. Rather, they may 
simply reflect the fact that the virtuous agent has direct insight into the 
requirements of virtue, occasion by occasion, where this insight does not 
admit of discursive justification. 
To develop McDowell's account in this way would be to turn it into 
a kind of rational intuitionism: moral reasoning would be construed as 
involving an element of quasi-perceptual intuition, where the virtuous 
agenf s intuitive responses are taken to be constitutively rational ones.33 
And there is much in McDowell's writings that could be taken to 
support this interpetation. Thus, it is a prominent refrain in McDowell's 
work on ethics that the experience of the virtuous life is marked by 
certain distinctive ways of perceiving one's circumstances of action. He 
writes: 'a conception of how to live shows itself, when more than one 
concern might issue in action, in one's seeing, or being able to be brought 
to see, one fact rather than another as salient.'34 This perception of certain 
features of situations as salient is in turn explained as follows: when the 
virtuous agent determines that a certain concern is to be acted on, in a 
33 I have in mind here a form of intuitionism which holds that virtuous agents have 
a direct, non-inferential, quasi-perceptual grasp of the right or correct thing to do 
in particular circumstances of action (i.e. what Sidgwick called the 'perceptional' 
phase of intuitionism: see The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett 1981], 
Book 1, ch. 8). 
34 'Virtue and Reason/ 344 
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given situation, the claims made by competing concerns are ordinarily 
silenced, in the sense that they are not taken to provide the agent with 
any reason for action.35 To have the conception of how to live charac- 
teristic of virtue, then, is to have a special perceptual sensitivity to the 
features of situations that present us with concrete moral requirements. 
This element in McDowell's account echoes Aristotle's tendency to 
resort to perceptual terminology when talking about practical wisdom, 
and suggests that it is indeed appropriate to construe his account of 
moral reasoning along intuitionist lines.36 
If this perceptual component is to be integrated into an account of 
practical reason, however, then it needs to be maintained that the 
virtuous agenf s capacity for immediate intuition is a distinctively ra- 
tional capacity. How are we to construe this further claim? The most 
appealing way to do so, I should think, would be to say that the virtuous 
agents' intuitive responses about what it is right to do are constitutively 
rational responses. That is, McDowell might deny that rational proc- 
esses are exclusively processes that are controlled by or justifiable in 
terms of further reasons or justifications; rather, rationality might be said 
to consist in part in a disposition to offer certain direct, intuitive re- 
sponses to practical situations, where these responses do not admit of 
any further justification. This would give to the intuitive responses of 
virtuous agents a role perhaps analogous to that which Wittgenstein 
assigns to agreement in judgments, as a condition of communication by 
means of language.37 The community of the virtuous would be con- 
strued as sharing a Wittgensteinian Lebensform; and the immediate 
judgments of the virtuous about what it is right or good to do would be 
constitutively rational, because they are among the conditions that make 
moral discourse within such communities possible. 
35 See 'Virtue and Reason/ 345-6, also 334-5; and compare 'Are Moral Requirements/ 
26-9; The Role of Eudaimonia,' 372-3. 
36 Cf . the references to aisthesis in Aristotle's discussion of phronesis in Book VI of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. The dimension of informed perception in a broadly Aristotelian 
approach to practical reason is also stressed in David Wiggins, 'Deliberation and 
Practical Reason/ in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 221-40. Whether 
Aristotle himself took practical reason to include a dimension of perceptual intui- 
tion is a more complicated question, whose resolution requires (at least) an inter- 
pretation of Aristotle's notoriously obscure remarks about nous in Book VI of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
37 See, e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.EM. Anscombe and 
R. Rhees, eds., trans. G.EM. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell 1953), §§241-2. 
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Having sketched this intuitionist reading of McDowell's account, 
however, I think it has to be admitted that it does not represent the most 
promising way of developing his ideas about practical reason. This is 
not to say that McDowell would not want to treat the community of the 
virtuous as sharing a kind of Wittgensteinian Lebensform (whatever that 
might involve); nor is it to deny that rational moral discourse must rest 
on something like agreement in judgments. The problem is that, on the 
intuitionist interpretation just sketched, the appeal to agreement in 
judgments that are not themselves rationally justifiable occurs alto- 
gether too swiftly. The intuitionist interpretation says that the virtuous 
agent simply and immediately perceives what is the right thing to do, 
in each of the circumstances that confront her, without being able to offer 
any rational support or justification for these intuitive judgments. But 
in complicated normative questions about the conduct of life we reason- 
ably expect people to have something to say in defense of their beliefs 
about the moral correctness, or lightness, of acting in certain ways. Thus, 
in the case sketched earlier we expect the virtuous driver to be able to 
give some account or justification as to why it is right to help someone 
out of a snow bank if one is on one's way home to watch the news, but 
not the right thing to do if it means breaking an engagement to drive a 
friend to the hospital - even if she cannot appeal to a general procedure 
or principle, equally applicable in other cases that might arise.38 At the 
least, she ought to be able to point to some morally significant distinction 
between the two cases which justifies their differential treatment. Her 
inability to provide any account of this kind would impugn her preten- 
sion to have a conception of how to live capable of guiding her conduct 
rationally through the complexities of life.39 
38 It is of course not required that the virtuous agent actually have this justification 
running through her head at the time when she acts, only that she be able to provide 
it if asked. Thus we may suppose that in the heat of action, the virtuous agent will 
often be able to perceive immediately what it is that she is required to do. This 
would support McDowell's account of the phenomenology of salience and silenc- 
ing, without requiring us to give these phenomena an intuitionist interpretation. 
39 Cf. McDowell's remarks about danger, in 'Values and Secondary Qualities,' 119. 
There McDowell suggests that the normative aspect of our responses to danger - 
the idea that those responses are merited by the things we take to be dangerous - 
shows itself in our ability to give an account of what makes certain sorts of situations 
dangerous (what he refers to as an 'explanatory theory of fear'). At the end of the 
same article, however, McDowell denies that the account provided need take the 
form of a set of general principles (122-3). This lends support to the connoisseurship 
interpretation of his views on practical reason, which I shall develop below. 
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Now I suspect that McDowell himself would not want to resist this 
conclusion. Virtue, he would say, involves a perceptual sensitivity to the 
morally relevant features of situations; but this perceptual sensitivity 
should not be construed as a constitutively rational capacity for unerring 
insight into the right or the good. Nor should the possession of this 
perceptual sensitivity be taken to preclude the provision of reasons or 
justifications for the virtuous agenf s individual decisions about what to 
do.40 On the contrary, it would be natural to suppose that the perceptual 
sensitivity precisely discloses to the virtuous agent the particular rea- 
sons or justifications in favor of doing what virtue requires, occasion by 
occasion. What is distinctively rational about this perceptual sensitivity, 
one might even say, is that it enables the virtuous to discern such reasons 
or justifications in the particular situations that confront them. At the 
same time the emphasis on perception in this account serves to under- 
line the fact that moral reasons or justifications are not grasped by appeal 
to any antecedent procedure or set of principles, as principle-dependent 
accounts of moral reasoning would require. Rather, practical reason 
enables the virtuous agent to see what her reasons or justifications are 
in a way that is essentially bound up with a perception of the particular 
features of the situations in which those reasons or justifications obtain. 
Interpreting McDowell's account along these lines yields a picture of 
practical reason as a form of connoisseurship. For connoisseurship is 
precisely the ability to appreciate heterogeneous, case-specific reasons 
for choice or preference by means of informed judgment or perception 
rather than the application of general principles or procedures. Thus a 
connoisseur (of wine, for example) is able to make discriminations 
which have normative force, between better and worse wines. But these 
discriminations cannot be understood as involving the application of 
general principles or procedures, for there is no such procedure or set 
of principles which explains what makes for a good wine, in all cases. 
Nor would it be accurate to describe the connoisseur's discriminations 
as the deliverances of intuition, since the connoisseur can provide, in 
every case, a justification as to what makes a particular wine good or 
40 Thus there are several points at which McDowell commits himself to the availability 
of arguments or justifications for the virtuous agent's decisions: see, e.g., 'Are Moral 
Requirements/ 21-2; 'Virtue and Reason/ 342; 'Might There be External Reasons?' 
§4. These passages suggest that the arguments available to the virtuous agent have 
a 'rhetorical' character, and so fall short of 'rationally necessitating' their conclu- 
sions; I take it the import of such remarks is to reiterate McDowell's view that moral 
argument and justification cannot be reconstructed as an appeal to antecedent 
principles. 
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bad. Furthermore it is plausible to regard the capacity to make these 
discriminations, and to provide the corresponding case-specific justifi- 
cations, as a kind of rational capacity, insofar as it represents a refine- 
ment of critical discernment and intelligence. 
Applying this connoisseurship model to the case of virtue seems to 
me to provide the most promising way of working out McDowell's 
conception of the role of practical reason in the virtuous life. The model 
itself offers a legitimate paradigm of one kind of rational capacity, whose 
application to the understanding of virtue results in a conception of 
practical reason that differs interestingly from both Humean and Kan- 
tian approaches. Moreover, this conception of practical reason preserves 
and explains several claims that have often been taken to distinguish an 
Aristotelian account of the moral life. It represents practical wisdom as 
a kind of refinement of judgment, involving a capacity to discern the 
particular features of situations that provide case-specific reasons for 
action - just as the wine connoisseur has an especially refined capacity 
to identify the qualities which make particular wines good or bad. 
Second, and perhaps more important, a connoisseur is someone whose 
judgments and discriminations set the final standards for deciding 
normative questions in his area of expertise. 
Thus there is no independent set of rules or procedures which could 
be applied by anyone to determine the quality of an arbitrary bottle of 
wine; rather, a good wine simply is a wine that connoisseurs agree in 
finding case-specific reasons to approve of. This echoes Aristotle's own 
tendency to characterize virtuous actions by reference to the ideal of the 
virtuous agent, as those actions that the phronimos would choose, per- 
formed as the phronimos would perform them.41 Such passages suggest 
very strongly that the concept of the virtuous agent is basic, in the context 
of an Aristotelian approach to ethics; and the connoisseurship interpre- 
tation of practical reason helps us to understand why an Aristotelian 
might take the concept of the virtuous agent to be basic in this way. 
Given the absence of a principled specification of the requirements of 
virtue, it is not possible to characterize virtuous action except by refer- 
ence to what the person of practical wisdom would do in particular 
situations.42 
41 Cf. 'Virtue and Reason/ 331, 347. 
42 McDowell is of course not the only philosopher to have emphasized the elements 
of non-principle-dependent, case-specific judgments in Aristotle's account of phro- 
nesis; for another recent example, see Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987), ch. 1. 
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IV Conclusion 
The connoisseurship interpretation thus captures many distinctively 
Aristotelian claims, and it does so in a way which allows us to make 
sense of McDowell's contention that the Aristotelian account of prac- 
tical reason is distinct from both Kantian and Humean approaches. 
The question remains, however, whether the connoisseurship model 
offers a more plausible interpretation of the role of reason in the moral 
life than principle-dependent accounts can provide. This is not a 
question that I can hope to settle in the space of the present essay. But 
in conclusion I would like at least to identify two potential problems 
for the connoisseurship interpretation of practical reason. One problem 
concerns the applicability of the connoisseurship model, in contempo- 
rary circumstances of moral discourse; the other concerns the suffi- 
ciency of the connoisseurship model even in those circumstances where 
it can be said to apply. I do not see these problems as decisive objections 
to McDowell's neo-Aristotelian conception of moral reasoning; they 
challenge neither its intelligibility, nor its legitimacy as a model or 
interpretation of one kind of rational process. My aim, rather, is to 
locate two respects in which the model of connoisseurship seems 
potentially inadequate to the predicament of morality in our culture, 
in the hope that doing so will help to make clear the continuing appeal 
of the principle-dependent conceptions of moral reasoning that Mc- 
Dowell rejects. 
The first problem stems from disagreement. It seems to me that the 
connoisseurship model will plausibly be construed as a model of ra- 
tional processes only in conditions in which there is a high degree of 
agreement among the connoisseurs. Of course this is not to say that there 
can never be disagreement among connoisseurs which does not impugn 
the rational status of their judgments or preferences. But such disagree- 
ment must be distinctly limited: if there were extensive lack of conver- 
gence among connoisseurs of wine as to which wines are good and 
which bad, then it would be correspondingly implausible to suppose 
that their judgments are rationally well-supported, or that they repre- 
sent a normative ideal of correct discrimination. If this is right, however, 
it suggests that the connoisseurship model will only yield a compelling 
account of practical reason in cultural conditions in which there is 
widespread agreement among the virtuous as to what virtue requires, 
in particular situations of action.43 
43 I am not suggesting here that correctness of judgment is constituted by convergence 
or agreement in judgment, on the connoisseurship model; but that a degree of 
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Perhaps such conditions obtained in the historical communities in 
which Aristotle himself lived and wrote, but they are notably absent 
today. Confronted with a great diversity of cultural influences, in a 
context of vast discrepancies of wealth both within and between political 
communities, we seem to live in an era in which virtue itself has become 
problematized, and which is correspondingly open to competing inter- 
pretations of what morality requires of us. In conditions such as these, 
the connoisseurship model seems an unpromising way to make out the 
claim that questions about what to do are susceptible of rational resolu- 
tion. Individuals may take themselves to have case-specific moral rea- 
sons for the particular actions they perform (such as commitment to a 
certain kind and level of charitable activity, or a decision to make a 
professional sacrifice in order to help a friend), and discerning these 
reasons will require various rational capacities for intelligence, imagi- 
nation, reflection, and so on. But other connoisseurs of the moral life are 
apt to be moved by case-specific reasons for acting in quite different and 
incompatible ways, and this will undermine the normative dimension 
of practical reason: the idea that the exercise of judgment enables its 
possessor to discern the uniquely correct or right thing to do, in particular 
circumstances of action. The connoisseurship model, in short, does not 
seem to be applicable to the case of practical reason in conditions of 
extensive disagreement among the virtuous. 
Perhaps McDowell could respond to this difficulty by acknow- 
ledging a plurality of moral sub-communities, constituted by agents 
who largely agree as to what virtue requires of them.44 The connois- 
seurship model might then account for the reasoned identification of 
correct action within these sub-communities, even if it cannot provide 
a means for resolving disagreements between members of different 
such communities. Developing his account along these lines, however, 
will only make more acute a second difficulty which McDowell's 
approach faces, stemming from its apparent elitism. Restricted in its 
applicability in this way, the connoisseurship interpretation implies 
that virtue is esoteric, in the sense that the rational capacities to grasp 
and appreciate the virtuous agent's decision are the exclusive posses- 
sion of those have themselves been inducted into a particular sub-com- 
convergence among the connoisseurs is at least a condition for the truth of the claim 
that their powers of judgment enable them to see matters correctly, or aright. 
44 Cf. 'Values and Secondary Qualities/ 127, n. 35, where he suggests that the require- 
ment of convergence or agreement in an account of correct judgment should be 
'radically relativized to a point of view/ 
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munity of virtue.45 Thus an agent who is not already a member of such 
a sub-community will lack the qualities of refined judgment that are 
necessary in order to grasp the case-specific reasons in favor of the 
actions that virtue is taken to require, within the sub-community - just 
as a person inexperienced in wine will be unable to appreciate what 
makes a particular claret distinguished. 
About such an esoteric interpretation of virtue, however, the question 
arises as to whether virtue so interpreted has any relevance at all to the 
lives of those who are not themselves virtuous already. Especially if we 
acknowledge a plurality of sub-communities of virtue, it will look as if 
the powers of practical reason internal to those sub-communities are 
particular refinements of human ability that have no more claim on 
people generally than (say) the capacity to appreciate wines, or twelve- 
tone music, or good darting matches on British television.46 And yet it 
is a familiar and reasonable aspiration of morality to provide a more 
comprehensive framework for regulating human behaviour, imposing 
requirements even on those who are not already virtuous. Aristotle's 
own moral theory seems to speak to this aspiration. In particular, the 
perfectionist strategy which I discussed at the start of this paper helps 
to explain how a conception of virtue which would otherwise be esoteric 
makes claims on all (male, non-slave) humans. It does so, Aristotle 
suggests, because the refinement of judgment of the phronimos repre- 
sents the unique realization or perfection of our essential rational nature. 
But as I noted earlier, McDowell explicitly rejects this perfectionist 
strategy, and denies that Aristotle himself meant to adopt it. Without it, 
45 In this connection see again McDowell's remarks about the 'external intelligibility' 
of the virtuous agent's conception of how to live (discussed in Section II above). 
46 In 'Might there be External Reasons?' McDowell contends that an amoral agent may 
have an 'external' reason for acting as the virtuous agent does. As he develops this 
point, however (see especially §6), it turns out to involve an extremely weak notion 
of an external reason. On McDowell's view, the claim that the amoral agent has an 
external reason to act virtuously is simply a reflection of the virtuous agenf s 
confidence in her own ethical outlook, a confidence which is supported by distinc- 
tively ethical arguments. This sort of confidence, however, might equally be sus- 
tained by members of a number of different moral sub-communities (or by the 
aficionado of music of the second Viennese school, to take McDowell's own 
example of a non-ethical case). To say that one has an external reason, in this sense, 
is to say no more than that there is a way of acting or judging which is in conformity 
with the (possibly esoteric) standards of some community. Even if we allow 
McDowell this way of speaking, however, the question remains as to the authority 
of an esoteric conception of morality to govern the lives of those who are not 
themselves virtuous already. This is the question I am raising in the text. 
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however, the connoisseurship interpretation is apt to seem a rather pale 
vindication of the role of reason in the moral life. It avoids the instru- 
mental implications often associated with the Humean conception of 
practical reason, but it does not do enough to avoid the subjectivism and 
relativism that are frequent corollaries of such a conception. 
This suggests that the question we need to ask about the connoisseur- 
ship model is not so much whether it applies to the case of virtue, but 
whether it is by itself a sufficient substitute for principle-dependent 
conceptions of practical reason. Recall that even on a principle-depend- 
ent account, there will be room to acknowledge the powers of refined 
judgment that are central to the connoisseurship interpretation. This is 
in effect the point I made in Section II above, when I argued that general 
principles or procedures would not necessarily be mechanically appli- 
cable to cases. Principle-dependent interpretations hold that the basic 
patterns of moral reasoning can be formulated in general terms; but the 
application of general principles or procedures in particular cases will 
require a capacity for discerning the case-specific features of situations 
that make some ways of acting in accordance with the procedures or 
principles better than others. An account of virtue should take this into 
account, by making room for connoisseurship in its ideal conception of 
the morally admirable agent, and by holding that moral education has 
as part of its task the cultivation of these powers of connoisseurship. But 
this does not exclude the possibility that we can formulate general 
principles or procedures which provide the governing framework for 
all moral reasoning and deliberation. 
The issue, in these terms, is whether we should rest content with a 
conception of moral reasoning as connoisseurship, or whether we 
should seek to supplement it with a principle-dependent interpretation 
of the basic patterns of moral reflection. Once the question is put in this 
way, however, I think the continued attractions of principle-dependent 
accounts will be apparent. First, the construction or formulation of 
principles or procedures of rational justification in the ethical life seems 
well suited to the conditions of fragmentation and disagreement that 
so characterize the contemporary ethical world. The primary task of 
practical reason in such conditions, one should have thought, is to 
provide a framework or context within which disagreements can be 
pursued and, as far as possible, rationally resolved; and the search for 
general principles or procedures of moral reasoning, if it could be 
completed, would deliver precisely such a framework.47 The identifi- 
47 This is, I take it, one source of the continuing appeal that utilitarianism has for many 
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cation of general principles or procedures of moral reasoning should 
also go some way toward addressing the problem of the authority of 
morality to govern or regulate our lives. Following the Humean 
strategy, we might try to show that the principles speak to some basic 
concern or desire - such as the desire to be able to justify oneself to 
others on grounds no-one could reasonably reject - that is widely 
distributed and deeply entrenched in human psychology, as a matter 
of empirical fact.48 And it could potentially be interpreted in Kantian 
terms, as an extension or development of forms of reasoning to which 
we are all susceptible, whatever our antecedent desires. In this case 
moral reasoning, far from being esoteric, would represent a kind of 
justification which anyone is capable of grasping and responding to.49 
Whether accounts of this kind can be made plausible is of course not 
a question that I can answer in this paper. It is enough to observe that 
principle-dependent strategies have some attraction, as against the Ar- 
istotelian alternative that I have extracted from McDowell's work; and 
that McDowell himself has said nothing that would call those strategies 
seriously into question (as I argued in Section II). There is a tendency 
among recent advocates of an Aristotelian conception of ethics to play 
Aristotle off against a rather crude and unappealing interpretation of 
modern conceptions of morality - especially Kantian conceptions.50 At 
the same time those working within the Kantian tradition in particular 
have been developing increasingly sophisticated and attractive ac- 
counts of what a Kantian account might look like, which are hardly 
vulnerable to all the standard objections.51 McDowell has done us the 
people, though I myself find Kantian strategies, or Scanlon's quasi-Humean con- 
tractualism, to be much more promising. 
48 This is Scanlon's suggestion, in 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism/ 
49 Thomas Nagel aims to establish this conclusion, in The Possibility of Altruism. 
50 Though there is not the space to argue the point here, I believe this is a common 
failing of the following works: Philippa Foot, 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives/ reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell 1978), 157-73; 
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press 1984); Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1986); Bernard Williams, 'Persons, Character, and Moralit/ and 
'Moral Luck/ both reprinted in his Moral Luck, 1-39; also his Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985). 
51 In addition to the works cited in n. 29 above, see, for instance, Barbara Herman, On 
the Idea of Acting from the Motive of Duty/ 77a? Philosophical Review 90 (1 981 ) 359-82; 
Christine Korsgaard, 'Skepticism about Practical Reason/ The Journal of Philosophy 
(1986) 5-25; Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason; and the papers collected in 
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service of sketching an interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of 
practical reason which relates it to a broader paradigm of a rational 
process, and distinguishes it from prevailing Kantian and Humean 
approaches. But the final assessment of his Aristotelian conception is 
going to require a much more serious engagement with Kantian and 
Humean alternatives than McDowell and other neo- Aristotelians have 
so far essayed.52 
Received: September, 1990 
Otfried Hoffe, ed., Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1989). Because of its obvious Kantian 
inspiration, Scanlon's contractualism might also be considered in this connection; 
certainly it seems to me more promising than utilitarianism as a way of developing 
a Humean alternative to the connoisseurship model. 
52 Conversations with Samuel Freeman, Michael Smith, and especially Wolfgang 
Mann were helpful in clarifying the ideas developed in this paper. I have also 
benefited from the very useful comments of two anonymous referees for The 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Work on the paper was supported by a grant from 
the Research Foundation of the University of Pennsylvania. 
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